Keeping a Proper Lookout -- A Cautionary Tale

[weavis]

Originally Posted by Muckle Flugga

and I am a FIRM believer that the place to find out whether your safety kit is up to the job is NOT while sinking off Madagascar or on fire off Barbados!

Madagascar? Barbados?

Whats wrong with sinking off Cleethorpes or on fire off Eastbourne? We know where YOU go for trips now................

Inverted snobbery there M.F. !!

[Muckle Flugga]

Originally Posted by weavis

Madagascar? Barbados?

Whats wrong with sinking off Cleethorpes or on fire off Eastbourne? We know where YOU go for trips now................

Inverted snobbery there M.F. !!

Well it is a global cruising forum. Plenty of members sailing in those locations. For the record I consider UK waters especially dangerous, and particularly a place where the PFD function should be considered a last resort, with the harness function first, as the waters are so cold and death can occur in less than one hour, pfd or no pfd.

Oh, and, snobbery? Not at all. Chip?

Remember, to some Cleethorpes and Eastbourne are exotic, never to be seen locations!

[weavis]

Originally Posted by Muckle Flugga

:

Remember, to some Cleethorpes and Eastbourne are exotic, never to be seen locations!

For the record, I was in one of the worst short wave experiences of my life off Eastbourne. Was in an Eventide 24 and all of us presented different shades of green. If was a blessed relief to get in the Marina and just lay on the dock till the world stopped going up and down.

[RichandHelen]

Originally Posted by RTB

No AIS on my boat, but interested. Does the AIS alarm go off due to proximity only? Or would it go off once a collision was imminent due to Shoreway's course change. The vessels were only 1.6 miles apart when Orca's skipper went for a piss.

Ralph

Any AIS EQUIPPED vessel that enters the caution zone (which you set) prompts an alarm - audible and/or visible on your chart plotter (the target flashes and turns red on my Raymarine). Sadly, on Biscayne Bay there are so many AIS equipped boats that I have turned the audible alarm "off".

[impi]

AIS ALARMS ON all the time ... and if relaxing or 'taking our eyes off the road' so to speak, definitely turning the radar on and setting up the monitoring zones with alarm.

We want an alarm for the boats that have not yet understood the importance of having AIS transceivers - thankfully certain countries are making it mandatory!

[Jon Eisberg]

Originally Posted by RichandHelen

Sadly, on Biscayne Bay there are so many AIS equipped boats that I have turned the audible alarm "off".

and, therein lies the problem with the increasing popularity of AIS transponders on recreational boats, in many respects in coastal/crowded waters, its utility will only diminish... Won't be too much longer where it will be akin to trying to drive at night, in the rain, in the future when every vehicle on the road is equipped with Xenon headlights, and every driver is being blinded by every other... :-)

AIS 'filtering' is a controversial and little understood issue at present. AIS will always have great value offshore and in less congested waters, and I still rate it as being the greatest leap forward as an enhancement to safety for solo sailors and shorthanded crews aboard recreational vessels. However, I think it's delusional to expect that the Big Boys will not ultimately be filtering out the vast majority of us in places like the English Channel, or Chesapeake Bay...

Those calling for AIS becoming "mandatory", might want to be careful what you wish for...

:-)

Panbo: The Marine Electronics Hub: Class B AIS filtering, the word from Dr. Norris

[impi]

Originally Posted by Jon Eisberg

and, therein lies the problem with the increasing popularity of AIS transponders on recreational boats, in many respects in coastal/crowded waters, its utility will only diminish... Won't be too much longer where it will be akin to trying to drive at night, in the rain, in the future when every vehicle on the road is equipped with Xenon headlights, and every driver is being blinded by every other... :-)

AIS 'filtering' is a controversial and little understood issue at present. AIS will always have great value offshore and in less congested waters, and I still rate it as being the greatest leap forward as an enhancement to safety for solo sailors and shorthanded crews aboard recreational vessels. However, I think it's delusional to expect that the Big Boys will not ultimately be filtering out the vast majority of us in places like the English Channel, or Chesapeake Bay...

Those calling for AIS becoming "mandatory", might want to be careful what you wish for...

:-)

Panbo: The Marine Electronics Hub: Class B AIS filtering, the word from Dr. Norris

Good point made here - still - in such congested waters one could set the alarm off and ignore the AIS if you so wish - use visual aid - in the end its better to have it than not and it should be mandatory. I am tired of these cruisers who sleep at night and don't display any AIS whilst we are taking every precaution out there and having to hail the 'unknown vessel skipper' to wake up and avoid a collision.

AIS is essential. Just tonight right here in Vuda Point where we arrived today in Fiji - an emergency call went out from a yacht called Allegro - the coast guard was not responding so I intervened by offering assistance by way of telephoning the coast guard on his behalf. The man was clearly bewildered as he had hit a reef (wife onboard), it was dark, the wind is howling and the seas are up a bit ... he was so disorientated (understandably) that he could not give me his waypoint position. I asked him quickly if he has AIS and he responded yes, so on with the chart plotter and under AIS list picked up his sailboat position through AIS and was able to transmit that to the coast guard who immediately identified another vessel on AIS in his proximity - help was then with him in a matter of minutes.

I am all for compulsory AIS legislation and yeah, in congested areas it will have less effect, but the advantages far outweigh the disadvantages ...

Of course this is just my opinion though ...

[Stu Jackson]

Originally Posted by Terra Nova

Up to now we have been in agreement. But it is important not to forget about other collision hazards, such as containers, that we likely will not see.

I can't figure out whether this is well-meaning advice and caution or pure paranoia.

Heck, there are whole trees floating around in the PNW!!!

Golly.

There are so many "things" out there, I wonder how anyone ever manages a safe and complete voyage without hitting anything.

Plastic anyone?

[FamilyVan]

There seems to be a misunderstanding on here about how guard zones work. The yacht had detected the dredger visually.

Guard zones alarm when crossed and would generally be set further then 1.6 miles.

Even a CPA alarm would likely not have helped. They are gereneraly left off in confined waters to avoid nuisance alarms, which can and do cause accidents on their own.

I'm afraid the technological terrors we have created are no substitute for looking out the window.

[Exile]

Originally Posted by FamilyVan

There seems to be a misunderstanding on here about how guard zones work. The yacht had detected the dredger visually.

Guard zones alarm when crossed and would generally be set further then 1.6 miles.

Even a CPA alarm would likely not have helped. They are gereneraly left off in confined waters to avoid nuisance alarms, which can and do cause accidents on their own.

I'm afraid the technological terrors we have created are no substitute for looking out the window.

I didn't read that any sort of over-reliance on electronics on the part of the yacht contributed to the collision, but maybe that's not what you're trying to say. The dredger was proceeding down a designated channel when sighted by the yacht skipper at 1.6 nm. The skipper apparently made a tragic miscalculation by assuming the dredger would stay in the channel & thereby stay out of the yacht's way. It was only after the yacht skipper had gone down below that the dredger changed course out of the channel and headed straight for the yacht.

Sometimes looking out the window is the best & only way to avoid the risk. In restricted visibility, then the electronics can become indispensible. Usually it's a case of using all available means, and which works best depends on the conditions and the body of water you're in. They're just tecnhological tools, not terrors.

[Viking Sailor]

Originally Posted by Exile

I didn't read that any sort of over-reliance on electronics on the part of the yacht contributed to the collision, but maybe that's not what you're trying to say. The dredger was proceeding down a designated channel when sighted by the yacht skipper at 1.6 nm. The skipper apparently made a tragic miscalculation by assuming the dredger would stay in the channel & thereby stay out of the yacht's way. It was only after the yacht skipper had gone down below that the dredger changed course out of the channel and headed straight for the yacht.

Sometimes looking out the window is the best & only way to avoid the risk. In restricted visibility, then the electronics can become indispensible. Usually it's a case of using all available means, and which works best depends on the conditions and the body of water you're in. They're just tecnhological tools, not terrors.

What if the yacht skipper had been hove-to to recover a MOB, and unable to get underway, would that also have been a "tragic miscalculation" on his part? His assumptions and actions where all reasonable. An unreasonable assumption would be that there was a grossly incompetent and negligent OOW 1.6 nm away.

The first mate on the dredger was the only one to do anything wrong. He alone was responsible for not making sure that the dredger could proceed safely on its new course. And, there are absolutely no mitigating circumstances in his failure to comply with the COLREGS.

[weavis]

Originally Posted by Viking Sailor

The first mate on the dredger was the only one to do anything wrong. He alone was responsible for not making sure that the dredger could proceed safely on its new course. And, there are absolutely no mitigating circumstances in his failure to comply with the COLREGS.

True-and yet.

Rule 5 is a short rule that places a large responsibility on the mariner. Rather than specific duties, equipment, places, times, and number of persons, Rule 5 requires the master to decide how best to maintain a proper lookout. Instead of giving us precise guidance on the adequacy of the lookout, the Rule uses vague terms such as "proper" and "appropriate." Only in this way could the Rule reasonably provide for all vessels at all times. Requirements covering even the most common situations would have been intolerably detailed and complex.

The lookout requirement of Rule 5 relies heavily on common sense and good seamanship. If you are able to comply with the Steering and Sailing Rules (Part B of the Rules) and with Rule 34--all of which depend on lookout information--you will no doubt have met the demands of Rule 5. A proper lookout, therefore, provides all the information needed to comply with those Rules. If the information collected by the lookout is insufficient, then the master must intensify his or her lookout efforts (for example, by turning on the radar) or reduce the need for information (for example, by slowing a fogbound vessel).

The "information gap" that sometimes opens between the amount of information collected and the amount needed to comply with the other Rules is a leading cause of most collisions. Too often vessels collide because they their masters have either ignored the gap or have filled it with assumptions. An appreciation of the lookout requirement will take the mariner halfway toward avoiding collisions.

What is a "lookout"? Perhaps the most common image that leaps to mind is that of a lone seaman wearing yellow foul-weather gear and a navy watch cap, stationed at the very bow of the ship and peering out into the gloom to catch a flicker of light or the moan of a foghorn. This perception is misleading. The term, as used by the Rules, denotes not a person but rather the systematic collection of information.

Responsibility for maintaining a proper lookout lies with the vessel's operator, not with a subordinate designated as "lookout." The vessel's operator--that is, master, watch officer, or person in charge--is the lookout manager. If the operator can keep a lookout personally, then coordinating the collection and analysis of information is relatively straightforward. But if the operator, that is, the decision-maker, must rely on others to gather the information, then management of a proper lookout becomes more complicated. The operator must ensure that information on the vessel's surroundings is detected in a timely manner and promptly communicated, so that he or she can correctly analyze the situation.

The purpose of the lookout is simple, so simple that it can easily be overlooked. As the purpose of the navigation rules is to prevent collisions, it follows that the purpose of the lookout is to collect the information needed to avoid collisions. This fundamental reason for maintaining a proper lookout is something to keep in mind.

Although the traditional principles of the lookout are still pertinent, today's mariner has tools available that greatly extend the distance over which information can be detected. Today, a proper lookout is a team effort. Yet the master of the vessel is the one held accountable. For this reason, the master must see to it that each member of the lookout team is competent in the use of equipment and diligent in the performance of that duty.

The master, who knows the vessel's needs for information and who has the authority and the Rule 5 responsibility, should determine the duties of each member of the lookout team. It is the master's duty to ensure that a proper lookout is maintained at all times. That duty cannot be delegated.

[FamilyVan]

Originally Posted by Exile

I didn't read that any sort of over-reliance on electronics on the part of the yacht contributed to the collision, but maybe that's not what you're trying to say. The dredger was proceeding down a designated channel when sighted by the yacht skipper at 1.6 nm. The skipper apparently made a tragic miscalculation by assuming the dredger would stay in the channel & thereby stay out of the yacht's way. It was only after the yacht skipper had gone down below that the dredger changed course out of the channel and headed straight for the yacht.

Sometimes looking out the window is the best & only way to avoid the risk. In restricted visibility, then the electronics can become indispensible. Usually it's a case of using all available means, and which works best depends on the conditions and the body of water you're in. They're just tecnhological tools, not terrors.

You are absolutely correct, I was not suggesting over reliance on electronics was an issue.

Several posters to this thread, particularly early on suggested it might not have happened if he had guard zones functioning. I'm suggesting guard zones would likely not have helped in the least. Detection was never an issue in this scenario.

Sent from my SGH-I547C using Cruisers Sailing Forum mobile app

[Exile]

Originally Posted by Viking Sailor

What if the yacht skipper had been hove-to to recover a MOB, and unable to get underway, would that also have been a "tragic miscalculation" on his part? His assumptions and actions where all reasonable. An unreasonable assumption would be that there was a grossly incompetent and negligent OOW 1.6 nm away.

The first mate on the dredger was the only one to do anything wrong. He alone was responsible for not making sure that the dredger could proceed safely on its new course. And, there are absolutely no mitigating circumstances in his failure to comply with the COLREGS.

While there's no doubting the gross negligence of the lookout on the dredger, there can also be little doubt that if the yacht skipper had not gone below but had maintained his watch, then the collision would also likely never have occurred. The MAIB report acknowledged this fact as well by concluding that both vessels had failed to maintain an adequate watch under Rule 5. Here's what the report had to say about the yacht's role:

The skipper’s assumption that Shoreway would remain in the deep water channel was influenced by his observation of Relume, which he had seen remain in the deep water channel. Relume was very similar in dimensions and showed the same aspect as Shoreway, leading the skipper to assume that Shoreway would follow Relume in the deep water channel.

As this accident demonstrates, a risk of collision can develop quickly when vessels are operating in the vicinity of other craft and maintaining a good lookout is essential if close quarters situations are to be avoided.

My comments are not intended to suggest or assign blame, or certainly mitigate the responsibility of the dredger. But the way the Colregs are designed, only one vessel being exclusively at fault rarely if ever occurs. Here, the yacht skipper's assumption that the dredger would continue its course down the channel was arguably reasonable. But given the subsequent course of events, it was nevertheless a tragic miscalculation.

[monte]

I don't know whether to laugh or cry when I read comments about the rule 5 wording being vague and open to interpretation. Maybe I was too busy during English class to understand the subtleties but to me there is nothing vague about this rule.

"Rule 5
Look-out
. Every vessel shall at all times maintain a proper look-out by sight and hearing as well as by all available means appropriate in the prevailing circumstances and conditions so as to make a full appraisal of the situation and of the risk of collision."

It's about as vague and open to interpretation as the UK road laws

Speed limits
You must not drive faster than the speed limit for the type of road and your type of vehicle. The speed limit is the absolute maximum - it doesn’t mean it’s safe to drive at this speed in all conditions.