Coast Guard report: Captain's errors primary cause of El Faro sinking

[Alberg30Shill]

https://www.cbsnews.com/news/el-faro...-guard-report/

[newhaul]

Sad the loss of life.

I'm seriously wonder about the USCG investigation saying captains error caused the sinking when there was a major engineering casualty shortly ( a couple hours iirc ) before the vessel was struck by the hurricane and sank.

[a64pilot]

It's always the PIC's fault, PIC is pilot in command.
Therefore I assume it's always the Capt's fault. It comes with the title and paycheck.
I'm not trying to be cute either, but even if something broke, it can be argued that he should have known about it, better planned for it, didn't execute the correct procedures for the failure etc.
Even if ordered to go into bad weather by the company, if the Captain does and something bad happens it can be argued that he should not have.
Being the HMFIC comes with its perks, and disadvantages too.

Being the person in charge, means you bear the whole responsibility.

[newhaul]

Originally Posted by a64pilot

It's always the PIC's fault, PIC is pilot in command.
Therefore I assume it's always the Capt's fault. It comes with the title and paycheck.
I'm not trying to be cute either, but even if something broke, it can be argued that he should have known about it, better planned for it, didn't execute the correct procedures for the failure etc.
Even if ordered to go into bad weather by the company, if the Captain does and something bad happens it can be argued that he should not have.
Being the HMFIC comes with its perks, and disadvantages too.

Being the person in charge, means you bear the whole responsibility.

At least TOTE is taking care of the widows and families of those lost.

[Randy]

Coast Guard was pretty succinct with their reasoning for laying blame at the Captain's feet. He repeatedly disregarded his officer's input as to storm location and intensity. He clearly overestimated the ship's seaworthiness and despite having been in Alaskan weather had no appreciation for the intensity of the storm he was approaching.
And don't even try to paint Tote Maritime in a favorable light. They are simply trying to minimize the lawsuits they will be facing shortly.

[newhaul]

Originally Posted by Randy

Coast Guard was pretty succinct with their reasoning for laying blame at the Captain's feet. He repeatedly disregarded his officer's input as to storm location and intensity. He clearly overestimated the ship's seaworthiness and despite having been in Alaskan weather had no appreciation for the intensity of the storm he was approaching.
And don't even try to paint Tote Maritime in a favorable light. They are simply trying to minimize the lawsuits they will be facing shortly.

Randy they have already settled with the families.

[transmitterdan]

If anyone wishes to read the actual report it is here:

https://media.defense.gov/2017/Oct/0...20SEP%2017.PDF

The report assigns blame aplenty in addition to the vessel master. The coast guard gets some blame as do the owners. As in most tragedies at sea there is more than one issue at play.

[newhaul]

Originally Posted by transmitterdan

If anyone wishes to read the actual report it is here:

https://media.defense.gov/2017/Oct/0...20SEP%2017.PDF

The report assigns blame aplenty in addition to the vessel master. The coast guard gets some blame as do the owners. As in most tragedies at sea there is more than one issue at play.

Dan thank you for posting the link to the full report. I will!spend the next days reading and digesting it.

[El Pinguino]

To summarize..

TOTE did not ensure the safety of marine operations and failed to provide shore side nautical operations supports to its vessels.*
TOTE did not identify heavy weather as a risk in the Safety Management System (SMS) and the Coast Guard had not exercised its flag state authority to require identification of specific risks.*
TOTE and the Master did not adequately identify the risk of heavy weather when preparing, evaluating, and approving the voyage plan prior to departure on the accident voyage.*
TOTE and the Master and ship’s officers were not aware of vessel vulnerabilities and operating limitations in heavy weather conditions.*
TOTE did not provide the tools and protocols for accurate weather observations. The Master and navigation crew did not adequately or accurately assess and report observed weather conditions.*
TOTE did not provide adequate support and oversight to the crew of EL FARO during the accident voyage.*
The National Hurricane Center (NHC) created and distributed tropical weather forecasts for Tropical Storm and Hurricane Joaquin, which in later analysis proved to be inaccurate. Applied Weather Technologies used these inaccurate forecasts to create the Bon Voyage System (BVS) weather packages.*
The Master and deck officers were not aware of the inherent latency in the BVS data when compared to the NHC forecasts. Additionally, the Master and deck officers were not aware that they received one BVS data package with a redundant hurricane trackline.*
The Master and deck officers relied primarily on graphical BVS weather forecasts rather than the most current NHC data received via SAT-C. EL FARO crew did not take advantage of BVS’s tropical update feature and the ability to send BVS weather information directly to the bridge.*
The Master did not effectively integrate the use of Bridge Resource Management techniques during the accident voyage. Furthermore, the Master of EL FARO did not order a reduction in the speed or consider the limitations of the engineering plant as EL FARO converged on a rapidly intensifying hurricane. This resulted in loss of propulsion, cargo shifting and flooding.*
The Master of EL FARO failed to carry out his responsibilities and duties as Captain of the vessel between 8:00 PM on September 30 and 4:00 AM on October 1, 2015. Notably, the Master failed to download the 11:00 PM BVS data package, and failed to act on reports from the 3/M and 2/M regarding the increased severity and narrowing of the closest point of approach to Hurricane Joaquin, and the suggested course changes to the south to increase their distance from the hurricane.*
The cumulative effects of anxiety, fatigue, and vessel motion from heavy weather degraded the crew’s decision making and physical performance of duties during the accident voyage.*


Of course this fails to mention the Jones Act.... only in the US would you find a 40yo POS like El Faro still in service.

[Pauls]

Thanks for the summary.

[poiu]

Here's a posting from the the NTSB showing a timeline in a graphical format:

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=AmqsKKtE4-I