US Navy destroyer collision

[Pelagic]

Very interesting article Randy and a good window into the Naval mindset

They seem to train for Segmentation of Duties, to provide fallbacks in the heat of battle, yet lack navigational consolidation and training for the more boring peacetime safe passages.

The Article gave positive recommendations and the Watch keepers definitely need a few weeks in Bridge/ Radar Simulators to reinforce both ARPA & COLREGS worst case scenarios.

Interestingly the Minesweepers Guardian that came to grief on Tubbataha Reef about the same hour on Junior Watch was another example of really basic mistakes by a fine bunch of guys that we would regularily drink with in Subic.

We have a piece of the hull mounted above the bar.

http://www.ibtimes.co.uk/tubbataha-r...corals-1488434

[TwoBlocked]

Originally Posted by estarzinger

Mmmm . . . . I would not suggest that navy's problem is a lack of resources.

Would be interesting to see the sea logs of all the sailors on the bridge and CiC at the time. But I suspect they had some (the usual mix of) experience on hand.

And I would not blame this on a "couple bad apples.

Nor would this incident require "rocket science" (advanced training or experience of any kind) to avoid. It was collision avoidance at its very very most basics - one inexperienced but alert watch keeper with his bare eyeballs and one helmsman with little sea time should have avoided it.

When a dozen people with the most modern survalance equipment and high agility/manouverability in clear and calm conditions can't stay out of the way of a container ship on autopilot (e.g. Steering a completely predictable course, transmitting ais, with a huge radar profile), combined with the porter and other lessor incidents . . . IMHO there is a much more fundamental problem at work - the process is broken.

Let's remember that we don't know just what happened yet. Could have even been a mechanical failure, or a non-systemic failure like the wheel getting turned the wrong way, and nothing to do with how the bridge gang was organized or trained.

BUT, ... I sincerely hope that nobody takes this wrong. It is not meant to be insulting in anyway, but rather understanding and complimentive ... BUT, the roles of merchant shipping and naval warfare are complete opposites and we can expect great differences in not only operations, but the mindset of the mariners. Merchants want to get their cargo safely from point A to point B. Naval warfare wants to prevent that. The former will tend to produce caution - following the rules. The latter aggression - pushing the edge of the envelope. And so when the mindset is to look for weakness and take advantage of them, rules, especially voluntary ones, might be bent on occasion. These are warriors that keep us safe, not school crossing guards. We can't have it both ways.

[Bigjim]

Originally Posted by TwoBlocked

...Merchants want to get their cargo safely from point A to point B. Naval warfare wants to prevent that. The former will tend to produce caution - following the rules. The latter aggression - pushing the edge of the envelope. And so when the mindset is to look for weakness and take advantage of them, rules, especially voluntary ones, might be bent on occasion. These are warriors that keep us safe, not school crossing guards. We can't have it both ways.

In times of peace there is no difference in how Navy ships and merchants make transits. The US ship was not conducting wargames or other training. They would have been keeping a normal watch and followed the rules of the road whenever possible.

Considering where the collision occurred (starboard side) the US ship was burdened. BUT, that also means the merchant was required to maintain course and speed. There are reports that the container ship changed course radically before the collision. I don't know if that is true. But even so, the destroyer has the speed and maneuverability to get out of the way. Period.

When I was in the service, we never allowed a merchant (or other) vessel within a mile of us unless we were in a channel of a harbor or other restricted area. But we will eventually find out what happened and why.

[Yowieboy]

Here's the latest Japan Times article on the incident:

USS Fitzgerald crash site off Japan known for congested nighttime traffic | The Japan Times

"How the collision occurred is still under investigation, but experts generally agree the Philippine-flagged cargo ship was likely trying to pass the destroyer from behind when the two collided."

[redsky49]

While a long time sailor, I have no big ship experience, nor US Navy experience (other than being hailed years ago by "Navy Warship" that scared the cr*p out of me while in the Atlantic), yet several issues till stand out:

1. Do the current class destroyers show clearly on typical commercial radars, and display commensurate with their size?
2. Why was the Captain not on the bridge during transit of such a problematic area?
3. Why was the Captain not summoned prior to collision? He was never notified?
4. Why was General Quarters or Collision Warning never sounded prior to collision? Was the Navy's first indication of trouble the sound of rending metal???
5. Along with the AIS disabled, was the Navy vessel also not displaying running lights?
6. If the OOD is nominally in charge of the bridge, what are his/her qualifications and/or experience?

There still seems to be much yet to be learned here. In the meantime, my respect and condolences to the families of the lost sailors.

[donradcliffe]

Originally Posted by Randy

There is some acknowledgement in US Navy circles that improvements​ need to be made no matter what the investigation concludes evidenced​ by the story in this link.
https://blog.usni.org/posts/tag/surface-warfare

I would not be surprised if one of the root causes of this accident is over-reliance on electronic devices, yet the recommendations are for even more electronics. I haven't read any reports on the Porter incident, but the minesweeper in Indonesia disregarded the lookout's report of a 'flashing light' and followed their chartplotter onto the reef--the flashing light was a lighthouse.

I think that an honest investigation will point out a 'failure to look out the window' and fatigue as major causes. It was interesting to hear that most of the ex-navy guys remarked on how tired they were from all the drills, whereas civilian watchkeepers have required rest periods.

[hpeer]

Originally Posted by Randy

There is some acknowledgement in US Navy circles that improvements​ need to be made no matter what the investigation concludes evidenced​ by the story in this link.
https://blog.usni.org/posts/tag/surface-warfare

I would like to add a fourth suggestion.
That naval officers and others standing bridge watch be assigned to an observer position on a commercial vessel for some period. Maybe to tug duty in NY or Longbeach. Maybe as a ghost for a Pilot. You get the idea, walk in the other guys shoes.

[Dockhead]

Originally Posted by donradcliffe

I would not be surprised if one of the root causes of this accident is over-reliance on electronic devices, yet the recommendations are for even more electronics. I haven't read any reports on the Porter incident, but the minesweeper in Indonesia disregarded the lookout's report of a 'flashing light' and followed their chartplotter onto the reef--the flashing light was a lighthouse.

I think that an honest investigation will point out a 'failure to look out the window' and fatigue as major causes. It was interesting to hear that most of the ex-navy guys remarked on how tired they were from all the drills, whereas civilian watchkeepers have required rest periods.

In the Porter collision, they were exactly "looking out the windows", and trying to do it by eye, rather than getting and processessing crucial data like bearing, CPA, and TCPA from their instruments.

You can't do collision avoidance by the seat of your pants and bare eyes. To know how to maneuver, you need information your eyeballs can't provide - are you on a collision course, or passing safely? How much time do you have? Is he passing ahead or behind? Is he turning or holding a steady course? Is he speeding up, slowing down, or maintaining a steady speed?

I seriously doubt that failing to "look out the windows" was the problem here.

[hpeer]

Just thinking about my sailing experience and interacting with the Navy from my wee perspective.

Let's say there is a Navy ship that is barely making headway but in the channel of an inlet, out bound. I'm screaming along at 6 knots behind him, also outbound.

It's my duty to hail him and arrange the pass situation.

Let's suppose he ignores me, or worse I fail to call him, I just come up behind him and close to within a 100 yards. What happens? I get a visit from an escort boat, maybe. If I close even more would they fire on me?

Suppose it was at night and I didn't call them and I had no running lights displayed, essentially running dark. What kind of reception should I expect?

[tankersteve]

Originally Posted by Pelagic

Very interesting article Randy and a good window into the Naval mindset

They seem to train for Segmentation of Duties, to provide fallbacks in the heat of battle, yet lack navigational consolidation and training for the more boring peacetime safe passages.

The Article gave positive recommendations and the Watch keepers definitely need a few weeks in Bridge/ Radar Simulators to reinforce both ARPA & COLREGS worst case scenarios.

Interestingly the Minesweepers Guardian that came to grief on Tubbataha Reef about the same hour on Junior Watch was another example of really basic mistakes by a fine bunch of guys that we would regularily drink with in Subic.

We have a piece of the hull mounted above the bar.

Tubbataha Reef: US pays $2m for damage caused by USS Guardian minesweeper to UN-protected corals

The commander of the Fitz was a prior commander of the Guardian. Not at the time of her demise, but a few years earlier. One could try to extrapolate the culture of learning and level of competency amongst the crew from one ship to another, but with personnel turnover being what it is in the US military, that is likely not the case.

Tankersteve

[estarzinger]

Originally Posted by hpeer

What kind of reception should I expect?

It really depends on who specifically you meet that night and what threat level they perceive.

You get some nice chill USCG folks and they don't perceive you as a threat . . . and they will tell you to take care and escort you by.

But you get some *******, who is insecure, and he can hassle you with fines and court, he can fire warning shots at you if he feels you are not giving him enough respect.

They are going to be very hesitant to fire directly at you, but they do have authority to do so in 'anticipatory self-defense' if they consider you a real and serious threat and feel they have used up all their other options and time.

Don't start shouting allahu akbar - lol.

[estarzinger]

Originally Posted by Dockhead

I seriously doubt that failing to "look out the windows" was the problem here.

What I still don't get . . . is they had the manpower and equipment to be doing everything . . . looking out the windows, standing outside on wings using binocs, watching several radar, and watching AiS - all simultaneously with dedicated individuals.

And still the officers do not seem to have been aware there was a huge container ship on a collision course (if they had been aware they would have called the captain at some point, and would have sounded collision alarm at the end).

I personally think they have a broken process built to support too many sailors essentially playing telephone. They should man this vessel with (total swag) 30 sailors supported with AI.

[Pelagic]

Originally Posted by estarzinger

I personally think they have a broken process built to support too many sailors essentially playing telephone. They should man this vessel with (total swag) 30 sailors supported with AI.

That will come sooner than we think

[Randy]

Originally Posted by Dockhead

In the Porter collision, they were exactly "looking out the windows", and trying to do it by eye, rather than getting and processessing crucial data like bearing, CPA, and TCPA from their instruments.

You can't do collision avoidance by the seat of your pants and bare eyes. To know how to maneuver, you need information your eyeballs can't provide - are you on a collision course, or passing safely? How much time do you have? Is he passing ahead or behind? Is he turning or holding a steady course? Is he speeding up, slowing down, or maintaining a steady speed?

I seriously doubt that failing to "look out the windows" was the problem here.

This is pretty much true but it's really the integration or lack thereof of looking out the windows and referring to the info on the radars.
Evans earlier responded to a statement that I made about resources being accessed on time. Each ship had more than enough resources available, neither appears to have made use of these resources. The investigation will clear just how this didn't happen.
For all the Navy's manpower and electronics, their use isn't consistently used well. A total lack of "Bridge Resource Management" and to me that's a systemic problem. If the Navy doesn't effectively deal with this problem and just punishes the personnel onboard Fitzgerald, nothing will have been fixed.

[Paul L]

Originally Posted by hpeer

Just thinking about my sailing experience and interacting with the Navy from my wee perspective.

Let's say there is a Navy ship that is barely making headway but in the channel of an inlet, out bound. I'm screaming along at 6 knots behind him, also outbound.

It's my duty to hail him and arrange the pass situation.

Let's suppose he ignores me, or worse I fail to call him, I just come up behind him and close to within a 100 yards. What happens? I get a visit from an escort boat, maybe. If I close even more would they fire on me?

Suppose it was at night and I didn't call them and I had no running lights displayed, essentially running dark. What kind of reception should I expect?

One interaction I had with a US Navy ship shows some of the terminology disconnect. The radio operator gave me distances in thousands of yards and told me to contact them again on a VHF frequency given in MHz. I asked him what channel that was and he didn't know.