US Navy destroyer collision

[Snowpetrel]

Originally Posted by Viking Sailor

And, one could easily think that you sir are a Russian troll spreading FUD about the U.S. Navy.

Seems like the US navy are quite capable of creating Their own FUD. It is scary seeing yet another example of the poor standards of accountability (and seamanship) in the most powerful Navy in the world..

[Dockhead]

Originally Posted by TwoBlocked

Good clip... I alluded in an earlier post about how these are warriors, not school crossing guards. I mean no disrespect. The mindset on a destroyer may very well be to - let's say it - DESTROY. Like in the clip, it raises the question of what we really expect from these guys. They may very well have "hot-dogged" themselves into this collision. Warriors do live on the edge, and a band of warriors will look after their own. The basic facts of the track of the USS Fitzgerald will surely become known, but just what transpired on the bridge, probably not. I doubt if the sailors are telling their own investigators the whole truth.

Sure -- DESTROY, but these "warriors" do this destroying, and avoid being destroyed themselves, by acute, intense awareness of all the targets around them, and the ability to deftly handle their warship to put her just where she needs to be to get that missile off, stay out of gun range, whatever. It's not "hot dogging" and not "big balls", but just pure failure, which goes to the heart of what they are supposed to be able to do as warriors, to get themselves under the bows of a big blundering mountain of steel like that. That's what really bothers me about this case.

[Snowpetrel]

Originally Posted by estarzinger

I have a question about navy bridge command culture.

Let's say you are on a collision course with a commercial ship, impact in 5 minutes, and the OOD the deck freezes - not making decisions or taking actions, not calling the captain, not sounding the impact alarm.

Will someone step up and push him out of the way and take over? If so, at what point?

I am asking about in the real world, not in theory? I guess there would be unpleasant consequences if someone tried to push the OOD out and he actually was not 'frozen'

I know that is a soft question, and the answer is probably "it depends", but thoughts?

This seems to me to be possibly the most "occam razor" explanation for this incident. One guy froze, no-one else stood up in time.

Here is the report on the HMS Southhampton. Differnet navy amd a long time ago. But it seems even though a few people 'had doubts' they didnt question the junior OOD.

http://www.3peaks.org.uk/Downloads/H...8BOIReport.pdf

Something like the two challenge rule?

http://www.kevinmd.com/blog/2013/07/...enge-rule.html

[Viking Sailor]

Originally Posted by justwaiting

Thank you for the illustration of my point. I will share the post with my nephew who is in Mosul with the Kurdish forces - it will amuse him heaps.

As an 100% disabled Vet, I assure you that with all of my heart and soul, I hope that your nephew is returned to his family safe and sound.

Still, you can not know how this will play out in the future.

I have spent time in Japan and the idea that the U.S. Military considers itself an occupying force is absurd.

No more can you know how Gen. Townsend cares about your nephew - then you can you know how the Navy brass feels about the crew of the USS Fitzgerald.

But most importantly, you have no concept of the operational security requirements that could be driving what you perceive as a lack of transparency and accountability.

[Astrid]

Originally Posted by Snowpetrel

Here is the report on the HMS Southhampton. Differnet navy amd a long time ago. But it seems even though a few people 'had doubts' they didnt question the junior OOD.

http://www.3peaks.org.uk/Downloads/H...8BOIReport.pdf

Something like the two challenge rule?

Cockpit culture and using the two challenge rule in the OR

Very interesting. It brings to mind another past incident involving a near collision involving the SS Arabic and a sailing vessel. The routine on the Arabic, as with most vessels, was to change the bridge watch at midnight, and the officer coming duty that particular night was Lieutenant William McMaster Murdoch. As was customary, he arrived fifteen or twenty minutes early so that the OOW could give him any news or instructions from the captain he might need to know, and at the same time allow Murdoch's eyes to adjust to the darkened bridge. Just before midnight, as the two men were conversing, the lookout reported a sailing vessel close ahead, and the OOW ordered the helm over in an evasive turn to starboard. Murdoch, looking ahead, realized that the order would insure a collision as the sailing vessel was just off the starboard bow and dashed to the wheel, pushed the helmsman aside, and took over the helm himself and brought the rudder back to midships. The two ships cleared eachother by just a matter of feet.

[hpeer]

Which brings back to mind my previous question, is this a one off incident or are there numbers near misses occurring?

Not a trivial question.

If there are no near misses then this is a truly unique situation and should be treated as such.

If there are near misses then this is a more systemic problem.

I'm assuming at this point there are few or no reported near misses.

Is there a common definition of "near miss" or something akin?
Is there any methodology for collecting such data?

I'm also assuming at this point the answer is "No" to both. So we are left wondering.

As a kid I was working crew on a small commercial boat. There were a number of us anchored. Bright clear day. A freighter came down on our little fleet, some had time to get anchor up and move, others let rode out and backed out of the way. No one was hit, only because of the self preservation instinct of the fishermen. Many years ago now.

[estarzinger]

^^ US Navy hits something big and public on average about every 2.5 years (over past 2 decades). Given the way statistical distribution curves (generally) work . . . you can guess there were an order of magnitude (or more) more near misses during that time frame.

[softdown]

As a casual observer, it appears that the Fitzgerald was unnecessarily stopped, in a broadside position, in a busy commercial shipping lane. This is both illegal and unconscientious. It borders on suicidal irresponsibility if true.

Cargo ships have the right of way as they should. Can you imagine airport safety if large commercial airliners always had to yield to small aircraft? Parked small aircraft on the runway at that?

[estarzinger]

^^ we do not know that Fitzgerald was stopped. There have been various translations of the Crystal's Captain's comments about the Fitzgerald. I personally believe the best/most likely is that the Fitzgerald was originally travelling on a steady track which did not create a collision situation with the Crystal (steady rather than stopped). But we dont really know.

[Lodesman]

Originally Posted by softdown

As a casual observer, it appears that the Fitzgerald was unnecessarily stopped, in a broadside position, in a busy commercial shipping lane. This is both illegal and unconscientious. It borders on suicidal irresponsibility if true.

Cargo ships have the right of way as they should.

There is just so much wrong with what you've written.

[Lodesman]

Originally Posted by estarzinger

I have a question about navy bridge command culture.

Let's say you are on a collision course with a commercial ship, impact in 5 minutes, and the OOD the deck freezes - not making decisions or taking actions, not calling the captain, not sounding the impact alarm.

Will someone step up and push him out of the way and take over? If so, at what point?

Again not 100% conversant with USN SOPs, but from visiting their ships and comparing to what the RCN does, I will suggest that it might be unlikely that anyone would bounce un unresponsive OOD; not because of the culture, but because no-one else might be aware of the danger. If there is a dedicated lookout, he/she will be fairly junior, might be on the other side of the bridge, might not have gained a appreciation of how to judge distance just from lights; and probably wouldn't know what to do other than report a close contact to the OOD. Helmsman and quartermaster might have the wherewithal to do something, but sitting behind the steering console without a clear view through the Bridge windows. Communicators and Boatswain's Mate are similarly blind to the world outside. If there is a 2OOD, he/she might be in the chartroom, or attending to other admin functions and not maintaining a visual watch. This in not entirely unlike commercial bridges.

[estarzinger]

^^ thanks for that perspective.

It is interesting I have gotten quite different responses to this question from the various people I have asked. I believe some of that divergence may be due to some of bridge command culture being specific to a captain/specific bridge crew, and some may be because of the difference in theory vs actual practice (as in your commend about various people possibly without a clear view).

[Astrid]

One of the things about modern bridges, particularly on smaller warships like my old ship, is they are extremely crowded, and it is difficult to oversee anything from a single position. There are just too many systems crowded into a small area and the OOD has to rely on his or her team to provide information. It seems to me that sometimes it might be detrimental to situational awareness, particularly if the command officer on the bridge is distracted by some new factor at a critical moment.

[30yearslater]

Originally Posted by Astrid

One of the things about modern bridges, particularly on smaller warships like my old ship, is they are extremely crowded, and it is difficult to oversee anything from a single position. There are just too many systems crowded into a small area and the OOD has to rely on his or her team to provide information. It seems to me that sometimes it might be detrimental to situational awareness, particularly if the command officer on the bridge is distracted by some new factor at a critical moment.

Precisely Astrid. When I learned to fly my instructor was fond of setting the priority as: Aviate, navigate, communicate. Simply put, fly the plane first, figure out where you are second and chat with ATC third. The mess on the bridges of most warships is a ridiculous clutter that distracts from item one. Sail the vessel first. There seems to be a sense in most of the military that more is better. From your ship to mine notice the difference from the brief bridge segment. Austere is an understatement. 1 Warrant officer a helmsman and 2 lookouts were the standard bridge crew. We were never overworked or inundated with useless information. Yes we were a combat ship. Some videos taken by various sources:

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=zpfEtb6rig0

and

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=irDmmcuU_f4

[El Pinguino]

And this is what the bridge of a modern ( OK 18 year old) merchantman can look like....

Full bridge team plus the master , or -effectively- the full berthing team.....

Although bridge manning is normally two she is designed for one man operation....