US Navy destroyer collision

[Auspicious]

Originally Posted by David M

USCG boats tend not to have their AIS transmitting either.

Which doesn't make it good policy.

[David M]

Originally Posted by Auspicious

Which doesn't make it good policy.

Not saying it was good policy. I think just the opposite that it is bad policy for them to effectively be hiding. I think their AIS's should normally be transmitting unless they have a really good reason to be hiding.

[SecondBase]

Originally Posted by Pelagic

It still just boggles the mind that this even happened in an open sea situation.

Unbelievably poor seamanship from sailors who are supposed to be the very best and well trained in the World at a huge expense to the American taxpayer and the families of those who died.

This is not only a navigation fail but also an utter tactical fail. Unfortunately it reminds me of the USS Guardian.

Would requiring senior officers, just before taking a ship command, to complete an instructor-graded, coastal passage of say Key West to Bar Harbor in a keelboat help?

I mean a situation where they are Personally hands-on GPS, Personally hands-on AIS and Personally hands-on Radar with their own butts on the line.

Might that type of pre-command sailing exercise reblue some salty basics that are easily lost during years in a PowerPoint / desk job? Someone transiting a shipping lane with a v-max of 7 knots learns, deep down in their soul, to pay a whole lot more attention no?

[Auspicious]

Originally Posted by David M

Not saying it was good policy. I think just the opposite that it is bad policy for them to effectively be hiding. I think their AIS's should normally be transmitting unless they have a really good reason to be hiding.

I certainly agree with that. In addition they (USN and USCG) should be setting a good example.

[estarzinger]

On AiS, I have a somewhat different opinion.

#1 These navy vessels have speed and agility, vast man power, and the best tech sensors. They should easily be able to avoid collisions even if no-one else could see them.

#2 Paintings a big homing target/beacon on a warship, espically during wartime time (and yes they do consider themselves to be at war . . . . Cole), makes little sense.

So, personally, I think it is unnecessary for collision purposes, and dumb for war fighting.

The imperative is for Navy to stop being so dumb. To be alert, the use all the info they already have properly, and to actually know the colregs.

Note: we know that Crystal saw FitzGerald just fine, on radar and then visually. We don't know yet why Crystal's turn was "too late" or if AiS info would have changed anything at all. Might have but also might not have, depending on details we don't know of how it actually played out. But in either case - Navy should have easily avoided the situation.

[El Pinguino]

After the collision a couple of AIS tx appeared in the vicinity of the collision identified simply as 'USN' ... they were support craft that had come down from Yokasuka(sp).....

Which is all that USN ships need to do.... and they only need to do it when in heavy traffic situations... just switch it on as required.

They don't need to give their name, navy ships.. any navy .. never do when you work them on VHF...

[Pelagic]

Originally Posted by El Pinguino

After the collision a couple of AIS tx appeared in the vicinity of the collision identified simply as 'USN' ... they were support craft that had come down from Yokasuka(sp).....

Which is all that USN ships need to do.... and they only need to do it when in heavy traffic situations... just switch it on as required.

They don't need to give their name, navy ships.. any navy .. never do when you work them on VHF...

Totally agree, turning a generic AIS on and off when appropriate is a no brainier , but modifying the naval mindset to be less aggressive and arrogant in a COLREGS situation will be more of a challenge.

The report said the Fitz seemed to have been "traveling faster" than was expected.

To me that is probable code that watch keeper panicked , increased speed and turned the wrong way right into the CS that was making a proper avoiding turn

[estarzinger]

I continue to have a different option on this.

If I were a navy policy maker, I would not think it a "no-brainer" to paint a big target on my warships during wartime.

And yes, an AiS saying "USN" or "Navy" or even "blank" is creating a homing target (how many class A's other than navy would say any of that?).

Again as a decision maker I Would ask why you even suggest it, as it would not have helped the Porter, might not have helped the Fitzgerald. And is totally unnecessary if the warship crew acts with even minimal competence.

[El Pinguino]

Originally Posted by estarzinger

I continue to have a different option on this.

If I were a navy policy maker, I would not think it a "no-brainer" to paint a big target on my warships during wartime.

And yes, an AiS saying "USN" or "Navy" or even "blank" is creating a homing target (how many class A's other than navy would say any of that?).

Again as a decision maker I Would ask why you even suggest it, as it would not have helped the Porter, might not have helped the Fitzgerald. And is totally unnecessary if the warship crew acts with even minimal competence.

Not suggesting they use it full time or even long time... hardly even short time....

However.. I think in this case AIS is a red herring.....

The navy ship could have been lit up like a christmas tree, had all the crew out on deck ringing gongs and cymbals, and had naked chicks on the foretop..... it would have made no difference... she was the give way ship and she didn't.....

Stand on ships tend to stand on too long as there is always the thought in the watchkeeper's mind... 'maybe she is just about to give way...... I'll give her a few more seconds... I'll give 'em five blasts... if I alter just as she alters it may make things worse... etc etc....

[Captsteve53]

UPDATE:

WASHINGTON, July 21 (Reuters) – The crew of the USS Fitzgerald was likely at fault in the warship’s collision with a Philippine cargo ship in June and had not been paying attention to their surroundings, according to initial findings in an investigation, a U.S. defense official told Reuters on Friday.

[Dockhead]

Originally Posted by estarzinger

On AiS, I have a somewhat different opinion.

#1 These navy vessels have speed and agility, vast man power, and the best tech sensors. They should easily be able to avoid collisions even if no-one else could see them.

#2 Paintings a big homing target/beacon on a warship, espically during wartime time (and yes they do consider themselves to be at war . . . . Cole), makes little sense.

So, personally, I think it is unnecessary for collision purposes, and dumb for war fighting.

The imperative is for Navy to stop being so dumb. To be alert, the use all the info they already have properly, and to actually know the colregs.

Note: we know that Crystal saw FitzGerald just fine, on radar and then visually. We don't know yet why Crystal's turn was "too late" or if AiS info would have changed anything at all. Might have but also might not have, depending on details we don't know of how it actually played out. But in either case - Navy should have easily avoided the situation.

I think that sounds reasonable.

And does acute situational awareness with regard to peaceful traffic around really present a different challenge, from acute situational awareness, with regard to hostile vessels around?

It seems to me that being able to place your vessel out from under the bows of cargo ships is a small subset of the capability of placing your vessel out of the range of deck guns of hostile vessels around, which should be very easily achieved using exactly the same resources and skills. Hostile vessels don't even broadcast to you where they are.

It is exactly this which makes this such a heinous fail, in my opinion. If they can't even stay out from under the bows of a cargo ship broadcasting AIS, what will happen when they are faced with a swarm of hostile warships?

[Auspicious]

Originally Posted by estarzinger

I continue to have a different option on this.

That would be an opinion. *grin*

I do take your point.

Early this week while approaching Chesapeake Bay from offshore there were, as is so often the case, a bunch of Navy warships to deal with. Keeping track of one guy making continuous turns to starboard, another guy wandering around doing contact management and situational awareness training, and a slew of other ships heading out or in was a chore. AIS overlaid on radar was helpful, but keeping track of the fast-moving Navy platforms took time away from other tasks.

Yes, transmitting "here I am" is a risk for a warfighter. I wonder if that is a good reason to eschew AIS or just an excuse.

[cliffdykes]

Sorry - I am late to the party on this.

With regard to the HMS SOUTHAMPTON/ MY TOR BAY collision in 1988, the warship was on Armilla patrol, escorting ships through the Straits of Hormuz.

Having escorted a vessel southbound, the warship was to pick up the northbound TOR BAY. It was a dark moonless night. In executing a 180 degree turn manoeuvre, the Officer of the Watch put SOUTHAMPTON directly under the bows of the TOR BAY (making 18 knots as I recall), which consequently ran into the side of the warship, which heeled over 40 degrees or so and was pushed sideways through the water for several hundred metres.The bows of the TORBAY cut right through to the keel, flooding two messdecks, the forward Electrical Distribution Centre and the Seadart missile magazine.

The Damage Control teams battled through the night to keep the ship afloat. Miraculously, no-one was killed and only 3 people were slightly injured. Were it not for the bulbous bow of the TORBAY, the collision would probably have cut off the entire front end of SOUTHAMPTON leading to her loss and no doubt the loss of many of her crew.

The Forward Section Base Officer subsequently told of knocking noises on the deck at the Forward Section Base during the night, which turned out to be live Seadart missiles in the flooded magazine below.


The 23 year old Sub Lieutenant who was on watch was doing his first night joining.

He, the Navigating Officer and the Captain were all Court Martialled. The Captain, who had been tipped for Flag Rank, was finished.

I was the Aft Section Base Officer and indeed the Secretary of the Board of Inquiry.

Quote of the Day was the Radio Operator on the bridge who with the bows of the TOR BAY towering over him after the collision, turned to the Officer of the Watch and said "See we made the rendezvous Sir!"

Human error, short and simple, which is I am sure the case in 99% of such incidents.

Happy Days.

Cheers
Cliff

[El Pinguino]

The AIS issue is neither here nor there, the 'I' in AIS stands for 'identification'... its not a collision avoidance system..it was originally designed to compliment VTS. Its use as a de facto collision avoidance system by yachts that lack ARPA or the ability to monitor a situation by eye does not alter that fact.

Ships avoided collisions ( well.. most of the time ) long before the advent of AIS, before ARPA, and - golly gosh - before radar turned up.

Moving right along..

If what I think we are hearing now... that the USN ship's watchkeeper - upon realising that the box boat was on a steady bearing - gave her a kick in the guts/ double ring 'full ahead' in an attempt to pass clear ahead .... that would have negated any collision avoidance move by the ACX Crystal by altering the whole geometry of the situation.

Think of of it this way. You are driving along and some punter walks out from the left... you steer right to avoid them.... and then they start to run.....

[IslandHopper]

Originally Posted by El Pinguino

The AIS issue is neither here nor there, the 'I' in AIS stands for 'identification'... its not a collision avoidance system..it was originally designed to compliment VTS. Its use as a de facto collision avoidance system by yachts that lack ARPA or the ability to monitor a situation by eye does not alter that fact.

Ships avoided collisions ( well.. most of the time ) long before the advent of AIS, before ARPA, and - golly gosh - before radar turned up.

Moving right along..

If what I think we are hearing now... that the USN ship's watchkeeper - upon realising that the box boat was on a steady bearing - gave her a kick in the guts/ double ring 'full ahead' in an attempt to pass clear ahead .... that would have negated any collision avoidance move by the ACX Crystal by altering the whole geometry of the situation.

Think of of it this way. You are driving along and some punter walks out from the left... you steer right to avoid them.... and then they start to run.....

Which sounds eerily similar to the HMAS Melbourne/USS Frank E. Evans collision, although In this case I prefer the analogy of 2 people walking towards each other and stepping in the same direction to avoid each other...

(I do have a personnel experience with the Australian Navy re no AIS transmission that I will relate later when I get home...)

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/HMAS_M...vans_collision

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/HMAS_M..._collision.gif

Melbourne's commanding officer during the SEATO exercise was Captain John Phillip Stevenson. Rear Admiral John Crabb, the Flag Officer Commanding Australian Fleet, was also embarked on the carrier. During Sea Spirit, Melbourne was assigned five escorts: US Ships Everett F. Larson, Frank E. Evans, and James E. Kyes, HMNZS Blackpool, and HMS Cleopatra. Stevenson held a dinner for the five escort captains at the start of the exercise, during which he recounted the events of the Melbourne–Voyager collision, emphasised the need for caution when operating near the carrier, and provided written instructions on how to avoid such a situation developing again. Additionally, during the lead up to the exercise, Admiral Crabb had strongly warned that all repositioning manoeuvres performed by the escorts had to commence with a turn away from Melbourne. Despite these warnings, a near-miss occurred in the early hours of 31 May when Larson turned towards the carrier after being ordered to the plane guard station. Subsequent action narrowly prevented a collision. The escorts were again warned about the dangers of operating near the carrier and informed of Stevenson's expectations, while the minimum distance between carrier and escorts was increased from 2,000 to 3,000 yards (1,800 to 2,700 m).

On the night of 2–3 June 1969, Melbourne and her escorts were involved in anti-submarine training exercises in the South China Sea. In preparation for launching a Tracker, Stevenson ordered Evans to the plane guard station, reminded the destroyer of Melbourne's course, and instructed the carrier's navigational lights to be brought to full brilliance. Evans had performed the manoeuvre four times over the course of the night. Evans was positioned on Melbourne's port bow, but began the manoeuvre by turning starboard, towards the carrier. A radio message was sent from Melbourne to Evans' bridge and Combat Information Centre, warning the destroyer that she was on a collision course, which Evans acknowledged. Seeing the destroyer take no action and on a course to place herself under Melbourne's bow, Stevenson ordered the carrier hard to port, signalling the turn by both radio and siren blasts. At approximately the same time, Evans turned hard to starboard to avoid the approaching carrier. It is uncertain which ship began to manoeuvre first, but each ship's bridge crew claimed that they were informed of the other ship's turn after they commenced their own. After having narrowly passed in front of Melbourne, the turns quickly placed Evans back in the carrier's path. Melbourne hit Evans amidships at 3:15 am, cutting the destroyer in two.