US Navy destroyer collision

[SV DestinyAscen]

Originally Posted by estarzinger

Seems like Navy does now have some public explaining to do, if they want to publicly state that ACX demonstrated poor seamanship (but offer so far zero support for that statement).

"The collision was avoidable, and both ships demonstrated poor seamanship," said the Navy's 7th Fleet in a statement.

Navy making a port turn in a head on situation, while ACX makes a correct starboard turn, does not paint them in the best light to throw stones. I guess perhaps it could be argued that ACX should have acted sooner, seems like ACX thought things were ok until Navy made the port turn - but we just dont know enough.

Navy should not be throwing out poor seamanship charges while refusing to cooperate with the JCG investigation and refusing to provide information to support that charge.

The ACX did not go off autohelm for another 30 minutes after the collision. DDG bears primarily responsibility for failing to maintain situational awareness and abiding by col reg, ACX failed to keep effective watch. If it was a fishing vessel or sailboat, ACX would have kept on going without any clue what had occurred.

[estarzinger]

Originally Posted by SV DestinyAscen

The ACX did not go off autohelm for another 30 minutes after the collision. ..... ACX failed to keep effective watch. If it was a fishing vessel or sailboat, ACX would have kept on going without any clue what had occurred.

LOL, no, you are not keeping up . . . . According to the ACX captain's testimony/report, ACX had two crew on watch, and one was manually helming at the time of the collision.

As stand-on vessel, they saw the Fitz, they tried signalling the Fitz, and finally they made an emergency turn to starboard to try to avoid the Fitz . . . as it was accelerating across their bows with a port turn. . . . . at least that is what we understand was the ACX's captain's report. And JCG has the bridge tapes from the ACX - so it is unlikely this is entirely a bald face lie .

If Navy believes (chose to publicly accuse) ACX demonstrated 'bad seamanship' here they need to explain and provide facts.

[SV DestinyAscen]

Originally Posted by estarzinger

LOL, no, you are not keeping up . . . . According to the ACX captain's testimony/report, ACX had two crew on watch, and one was manually helming at the time of the collision.

As stand-on vessel, they saw the Fitz, they tried signalling the Fitz, and finally they made an emergency turn to starboard to try to avoid the Fitz . . . as it was accelerating across their bows with a port turn. . . . . at least that is what we understand was the ACX's captain's report. And JCG has the bridge tapes from the ACX - so it is unlikely this is entirely a bald face lie .

If Navy believes (chose to publicly accuse) ACX demonstrated 'bad seamanship' here they need to explain and provide facts.

Do you have a copy of this report? I would like to read it - as I have read the Navy's and looked at the AIS tracts from moment of approximate impact to about 1 hr later when ACX I recall switched to not under command on AIS.

I find it curious that ACX after collision maintained course and stayed on autohelm for ~30 minute after impact - and there's no indication it made any attempt to notify authorities that collision occurred. Per the USN report, there were failings on the DDG as primarily cause of accident - but the ACX didn't appear to exercise good seamanship either.

Do I think the ACX could have avoided the collision? Probably not. The best it could do is to alert the DDG - however I'd like to see the primary source of your report because it doesn't comport with primary AIS data.

[estarzinger]

^^ the captain's report (as we understand it) does in fact accord exactly with the ACX AiS track.

The full report is not public (as far as I know). What is public is a Japanese translation of an extract/summary of it. There are two decent translations of it up in this thread. The Reuter's english translation is extremely poor (but does at least include the two observations about watchkeepers and human helm).

[SV DestinyAscen]

So you haven't read the report?

[estarzinger]

^^ lol . . . . as I said, it is not public, the only people I am aware who have read the full report are the ACX owners, the JCG and one Japanese reporter - who wrote the summary.

The summery that was written, and is public, is consistent with the AiS track. And there is very little reason to believe the captain's report would be inconsistent with the AiS track or with the ACX bridge data/tape - the Captain would know full well the JCG would have access to both those sources to confirm his statement. However, it represents his perspective, and we know that eye witnesses often see events thru their own lenses, so the Navy data might well reveal a different perspective.

Which returns us to the current point . . . if Navy is going to publicly point 'bad seamanship' fingers, in contradiction of the ACX captain, they need to support the charge.

[SV DestinyAscen]

Shrug. Seems to be there's a lot of hearsay information that doesn't comport with primary data available - and assumptions being made re motivations and statements.

You can make snide insults about not keeping up or lol at me - but I'm looking for primary source of information not a article alluding to report in another language.

[estarzinger]

Originally Posted by SV DestinyAscen

for primary source of information

shrug, there is very little; the JCG has suspended their investigation because they can't get information from US Navy, US Navy has refused to release anything at all, and ACX Owners have just released enough to defend themselves from the Navy smear campaign.

Again, if Navy wants to publicly accuse ACX of poor seamanship . . . it's on them to publicly back that up. They are the one holding up all the primary sources.

[redsky49]

Perhaps it is time for some of us to walk away from their computer and go sailing.

[Pelagic]

Originally Posted by estarzinger

shrug, there is very little; the JCG has suspended their investigation because they can't get information from US Navy, US Navy has refused to release anything at all, and ACX Owners have just released enough to defend themselves from the Navy smear campaign.

Again, if Navy wants to publicly accuse ACX of poor seamanship . . . it's on them to publicly back that up. They are the one holding up all the primary sources.

Perfectly summarised!

It is a Catch-22 trying to explain this to some of our navy stalwarts here and does the reputation of the country no good.

[Pelagic]

And to those who ask why bother??

I feel for the Filipino Captain whose career is on the line.

Unless he is officially exonerated by an independent and respected investigation , their will be a cloud over his reputation.

That could have been me!

[estarzinger]

^^ Pelagic, I'v been meaning to ask you about the 30 minute turn around time after the collision. Do you think that was 'reasonable'/'seaman like' given the circumstances?

The GCaptain feeling is "It took them less than 30 minutes to come about. They would have had to sound the general alarm, wake the crew at 0130, perform damage assessments to make sure they weren’t taking on water, then have the engineers prep the heavy fuel engine for maneuvering. I don’t believe it’s reasonable to expect that to be done any faster than they did."

I dont have any experience with heavy fuel engines, so have no opinion at all.

[Snowpetrel]

Evans, I can't remember all the details, been a few years since I was last on a HFO ship, but normally it was a 40 minute notice and slowdown cycle from full away on passage to standy main engines. A fair bit of that was engineers drinking coffee, and they could do it much faster at a pinch. We had full bridge control, and in theory we could pull back the sticks anytime. But the full procedures and checks they went through took a fair bit of time, and the risks of rushing were a blacked out ship (loss of all power and steering except basic emergency lighting and comms) or even a cracked liner due to high thermal stresses in the engine.

I think the half hour might have been a bit longer than needed, but they also had damage assessments to do. Did they end up following the informal TSS, ie exit it and run down the correct side, or did they cut across the separation zone?

[Pelagic]

Originally Posted by estarzinger

^^ Pelagic, I'v been meaning to ask you about the 30 minute turn around time after the collision. Do you think that was 'reasonable'/'seaman like' given the circumstances?

The GCaptain feeling is "It took them less than 30 minutes to come about. They would have had to sound the general alarm, wake the crew at 0130, perform damage assessments to make sure they weren’t taking on water, then have the engineers prep the heavy fuel engine for maneuvering. I don’t believe it’s reasonable to expect that to be done any faster than they did."

I dont have any experience with heavy fuel engines, so have no opinion at all.

Yes that time frame is reasonable for some of your points but also to plot the U-Turn....given that they were in a high traffic area.

If I remember correctly on the AIS history, they had vessels on either side, they slowed down to let them overtake and pass , then made the U-Turn to approach the Fitz in the proper sector for that informal Traffic Scheme.

Captain did a very professional and seamanlike job of making sure one collision did not lead to a 2nd collision with a larger ship.

[TwoBlocked]

Originally Posted by TwoBlocked

Read through the report. There was no mention of de-ballasting or transferring ballast or fuel to counter the starboard list and trim down by the head (which wasn't mentioned either...). Maybe they couldn't due to lack of power, but I doubt it because they were able to run one engine. Perhaps some savvy MKs did so without it being recorded.

Thinking more about this report:

http://www.secnav.navy.mil/foia/read...Fitzgerald.pdf

Maybe no one here understands or cares or are just interested in bashing the Navy or bashing the Navy bashers. If so, I'll just let this go. But for the bashing folk, what is in this report may show the propensity of the Navy to be completely open and truthful about this tragedy or not. Myself, I am more interested in what damage the DDG took and how it stayed afloat.

As I mentioned many, many posts ago, I wondered if the ship really "saved itself" - whether enough compartments were flooded and otherwise compromised to put it in danger of capsizing or sinking. From what I read, no, it was never in danger of being lost, but I would be thankful for anyone else interested and knowledgeable to look through the report and give their opinion.

In particular, as I understand it, when the port side scuttle on the deck between Berthing 2 and Berthing 1 above it overflowed and the last man escaped from Berthing 2, they were unable to secure it due to the inflow of seawater. They did shut the watertight hatch a deck above between Berthing 1 and the main deck, as was prudent and proper, but did this action really "save the ship", sealing a main deck scuttle? Apparently not, when reading about the efforts to educt the 5 feet of water in Berthing 1 which was in "free communication with the sea." (Much more dangerous that either flooding or free surface effect.)

Something else I noticed about the report is there was no mention of the engingeroom side of things. Simply the time noted when the starboard shaft was locked. OK, I am sure they sounded all the tanks and voids and isolated power as needed, but no such actions are mentioned, neither why the starboard shaft was locked. The reason I mention this is that the entire focus of this report seems to say how wonderful the crew was at performing their duties (and they were!) But as a critique of how effective the damage control efforts were in "saving the ship" it really doesn't say. Perhaps they are avoiding saying it.