USNavy Report on Fitzgerald Collision.

[Lodesman]

Originally Posted by El Pinguino

Even if at anchor you may be found partly responsible but not in this case...
https://www.ntsb.gov/safety/safety-r...ters/M90_8.pdf
...
Seems the CO was an aviator.... and after a pretty impressive career ...

Interesting incident to drag up. Didn't get much out of your link - had to google it.
https://apps.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a274926.pdf
Naval Science 302: Lesson 14

A little perspective - this happened over 30 years ago; before they had GPS and other fancy widgets. Chances are a lot has changed in the USN since - some for the better, and likely some for the worse.

Some things I noticed, was that nowhere did they say the XO was on the bridge; nor was the XO's background described - this is curious. I was aware that USN carrier COs were aviators; I was surprised that the navigator and OOD were also. The only SWOs mentioned were very junior. Perhaps it was the arrogance of the USN's aviation community to think that they the Navy's elite could easily do what the SWOs do without the same amount of training and experience.

Clearly they lacked a basic understanding of how to use navigation radars - simple parallel indices (PIs) would have kept them on track and a safety PI could have kept them off Urduliz. The rest of the accident comes down to having the most experienced shiphandler (the CO) entertaining senior officers and officials, instead of driving his ship.

The USN does not train it's navigators in the same sense that Admiralty-derived navies do. The navigation "team" puts one person on the port wing gyro repeater, one on the stbd wing repeater, and one at the chart. They take continuous "fixes" - one from each side off previously-agreed upon points. Anyone moderately-skilled at basic navigation can see the problems with this method. First 2-point "fixes" don't indicate or correct for gyro error. Also, unless any discrepancy between the port and stbd repeaters is measured beforehand and frequently during the transit, this is going to further exacerbate the fix error. 1988 pre-dates ring-laser gyros and INS, and mechanical gyros could have errors change with each course change - frequent gyro checks are a pilotage essential. And unless there is a psychic bond between the sight-taker and the plotter, it is a virtual certainty that the plot-line will not always be taken from the correct feature on the chart. As the reports said, there was something like an 18-minute gap between "good" fixes, and those fixes were justifiably suspect. I know the USN still used this pilotage method into the late 90s; I don't know if it has changed since, but suspect that electronic charting systems and GPS would have made this method largely redundant.

[Adelie]

Yeah that one’s a classic.
Blame all around including the USCG.
My understanding is that the USN big ships started using pilots after that but their use has since fallen off as COs forgot or did not learn of the incident.

[Cpt Pat]

Originally Posted by auruguay

Exactly!!!!

PS.: I read some guys here also have experience from flying. I have a strong belief that maritime cruising safety could benefit a lot from mixing the experiences and knowledge from the Aviation, both from an Operational as also from an Engineering point of view. Maybe this could justify a separate post, you tell me.

I wish you would post more.

As a pilot myself, I see some huge common gaps and dangerous assumptions in the sailing culture. Regarding the "captain as God," instead of practicing crew resource management* (CRM), is one dangerous practice. I have only one set of eyes. While as skipper, I am ultimately accountable, everyone is responsible for safety. When I tell a crew: "if you see something, say something;" I sometimes get "what planet are you from?" looks.

Aviation decision making: which in essence is "how to deal with surprises and disappointments," is another. Even using checklists is something completely foreign for some crews.

I look at the differences between aviation and nautical risk management as being akin to comparing American and European cultures: Aviation and America haven't been around long enough to develop an entrenched historical culture that one has to drag around like a prisoner's ball and chain. It's less encumbered. But there's enormous resistance to change, and cultures rarely change by any means other than by "attrition."


We are well past the days when someone would beat a drum while the crew was whipped to row faster. But there are still skippers around who think they are God aboard their vessels. Those are the ones I stay away from.


* See https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Crew_resource_management for a general description of CRM.

[jmorrison146]

Originally Posted by Lodesman

Interesting incident to drag up. Didn't get much out of your link - had to google it.
https://apps.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a274926.pdf
Naval Science 302: Lesson 14

A little perspective - this happened over 30 years ago; before they had GPS and other fancy widgets. Chances are a lot has changed in the USN since - some for the better, and likely some for the worse.

Some things I noticed, was that nowhere did they say the XO was on the bridge; nor was the XO's background described - this is curious. I was aware that USN carrier COs were aviators; I was surprised that the navigator and OOD were also. The only SWOs mentioned were very junior. Perhaps it was the arrogance of the USN's aviation community to think that they the Navy's elite could easily do what the SWOs do without the same amount of training and experience.

Clearly they lacked a basic understanding of how to use navigation radars - simple parallel indices (PIs) would have kept them on track and a safety PI could have kept them off Urduliz. The rest of the accident comes down to having the most experienced shiphandler (the CO) entertaining senior officers and officials, instead of driving his ship.

The USN does not train it's navigators in the same sense that Admiralty-derived navies do. The navigation "team" puts one person on the port wing gyro repeater, one on the stbd wing repeater, and one at the chart. They take continuous "fixes" - one from each side off previously-agreed upon points. Anyone moderately-skilled at basic navigation can see the problems with this method. First 2-point "fixes" don't indicate or correct for gyro error. Also, unless any discrepancy between the port and stbd repeaters is measured beforehand and frequently during the transit, this is going to further exacerbate the fix error. 1988 pre-dates ring-laser gyros and INS, and mechanical gyros could have errors change with each course change - frequent gyro checks are a pilotage essential. And unless there is a psychic bond between the sight-taker and the plotter, it is a virtual certainty that the plot-line will not always be taken from the correct feature on the chart. As the reports said, there was something like an 18-minute gap between "good" fixes, and those fixes were justifiably suspect. I know the USN still used this pilotage method into the late 90s; I don't know if it has changed since, but suspect that electronic charting systems and GPS would have made this method largely redundant.

Have you seen a crack bridge team in action? I doubt it. The idea that just two LOPs would be used is ludicrous. Concise, accurate three-minute fixes using visual bearings, radar ranges, and soundings and a navigator's report to the Conning Officer within that three minutes are the norm. GPS has been added to the mix.

"Excellent/good/poor fix minute XX hold you XX yards left/right of track and XX yards ahead/behind DR. Recommend XYZ. Set is XXX and drift is XXX. Next aid to to navigation is XYZ. Time to turn is XX minutes, turn bearing/range is XXX on XXX. Nearest shoal water is XYZ."

Easy peezy, all day long, reports every three minutes.

[Dockhead]

Originally Posted by jmorrison146

Have you seen a crack bridge team in action? I doubt it. The idea that just two LOPs would be used is ludicrous. Concise, accurate three-minute fixes using visual bearings, radar ranges, and soundings and a navigator's report to the Conning Officer within that three minutes are the norm. GPS has been added to the mix.

"Excellent/good/poor fix minute XX hold you XX yards left/right of track and XX yards ahead/behind DR. Recommend XYZ. Set is XXX and drift is XXX. Next aid to to navigation is XYZ. Time to turn is XX minutes, turn bearing/range is XXX on XXX. Nearest shoal water is XYZ."

Easy peezy, all day long, reports every three minutes.

Ludicrous, but if you read the report, it seems to be what they were doing.


If you had told me that a DD crew would be barrelling through shipping lanes using only AIS on an old laptop to determine the presence of other vessels, I would also have said "ludicrous!!" But that seems to be exactly what the Fitz crew was doing -- they were apparently not maintaining an effective radar watch at all, and the radar operator was not communicating with the bridge.


Since unlike most of the people posting in this thread, you seem to know something about the standard procedures, maybe you could read both reports and give us your analysis?

[Dockhead]

Originally Posted by Lodesman

. . . Clearly they lacked a basic understanding of how to use navigation radars - simple parallel indices (PIs) would have kept them on track and a safety PI could have kept them off Urduliz. . . .

Bit of a drift, but I wonder how many recreational sailors use parallel indices, or even know how to set them?


Such a drift, actually, that on second thought, I decided it would be better to discuss in a new thread:


Parallel Indices -- Still Relevant? - Cruisers & Sailing Forums

[jmorrison146]

Originally Posted by Dockhead

Ludicrous, but if you read the report, it seems to be what they were doing.


If you had told me that a DD crew would be barrelling through shipping lanes using only AIS on an old laptop to determine the presence of other vessels, I would also have said "ludicrous!!" But that seems to be exactly what the Fitz crew was doing -- they were apparently not maintaining an effective radar watch at all, and the radar operator was not communicating with the bridge.


Since unlike most of the people posting in this thread, you seem to know something about the standard procedures, maybe you could read both reports and give us your analysis?

I've read both reports and more and my analysis is that both ships screwed up in just about every way imaginable form basic seamanship to senior leadership. With that said, from my firsthand experience the majority of USN ships and I dare say all USCG ships are squared away.

There are numerous examples of merchant shipping failures. Try Andrea Doria, Spirit of Free Enterprise , Costa Concordia, etc. Merchant vessel collisions occur all the time for many of the same reasons as the USN.

[Lodesman]

Originally Posted by jmorrison146

Have you seen a crack bridge team in action? I doubt it.

No need to be rude. Not wanting to sound too boastful, but I have seen crack bridge teams in action - I was a Navigating Officer in the RCN!
But I admit I have not watched a USN bridge team in action. I have had a lot of close interactions with the USN and have heard from USN navigators how they conducted pilotage. I've also witnessed some "navigationally questionable" actions by USN ships over the years.

The idea that just two LOPs would be used is ludicrous. Concise, accurate three-minute fixes using visual bearings, radar ranges, and soundings and a navigator's report to the Conning Officer within that three minutes are the norm. GPS has been added to the mix.

"Excellent/good/poor fix minute XX hold you XX yards left/right of track and XX yards ahead/behind DR. Recommend XYZ. Set is XXX and drift is XXX. Next aid to to navigation is XYZ. Time to turn is XX minutes, turn bearing/range is XXX on XXX. Nearest shoal water is XYZ."

Easy peezy, all day long, reports every three minutes.

Do you have first-hand experience? Do you care to tell us about it?

[Lodesman]

Originally Posted by jmorrison146

I dare say all USCG ships are squared away.

USCGCs White Alder, Cuyahoga, Blackthorn, Thetis - exceptions?

[kmacdonald]

Most recreational sailors sail in much more congested waters than ships, don't have a complete array of electronic equipment, don't have dedicated operators, and have the common sense to get from A to B without crashing. They don't try and make it harder than it is. Their brains can do in milliseconds what it takes a "crack bridge team" to do in three minutes. There are those that think more electronics will substitute for incompetence and lack of situational awareness but it won't, they crash and burn.

When you really are competent, you don't have to hide behind layers of command and rely on "crack teams" to inform you of the situations in front of you. You already know. You don't panic and are comfortable in ALL situations that come up. You don't make mountains out of mole hills. Some people just don't have the aptitude and nothing will change that despite their best feeble efforts. If cruising has become a full time navigation challenge for you, golf might be a better past time.

[Montanan]

Originally Posted by Lodesman

USCGCs White Alder, Cuyahoga, Blackthorn, Thetis - exceptions?

White Alder - SS Helena report.

http://https://www.dco.uscg.mil/Port...lderhelena.pdf

Summary copied below.

[kmacdonald]

The Navy ships are riddled with prostitution, drug dealing, gambling, assassinations, gangs (MS-13), drug smuggling, etc. There is even a movie about it. It rally shouldn't surprise anyone that they can't safely navigate from A to B.

[StuM]

Someone believes NCIS is a documentary

[Montanan]

Originally Posted by StuM

Someone believes NCIS is a documentary

And I thought they where all taught to be chefs. Master chefs with specialized training.

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Rl8pTF4f3Jg

[kmacdonald]

Originally Posted by StuM

Someone believes NCIS is a documentary

No, it's called situational awareness. I don't stick my head up it and listen to BS from boys that still wear uniforms with merit badges. Remember the turret explosion? One of the many navy conclusions was it was murder in order to collect on a life insurance policy. Then they decided the sailor was gay and committed suicide. It was a seemingly never ending line of BS and they didn't seem interested in determining what really happened, only wanted to save what little face they had. Now if they knew how to use parallel indices all that would have never happened.